Economy · International
Argentina under Milei, without picking a side: what has really improved and what has got worse
Inflation has gone from 211.4% in 2023 to 33% in 2026. There is a budget surplus for the first time in more than a decade. And at the same time, poverty shot up to 52.9% in the first half of 2024, fell to 28.2% at the close of 2025 and rose again to 32.3% in the first half of 2026, and utility bills have multiplied. This is what the numbers say, not the narratives built to persuade or to radicalise.
In Argentina almost nobody looks at the data: they look at which side you are on. For some, Javier Milei — president since December 2023 — is the man who tamed inflation; for others, the man who sank the poor. Both are partly right. So it helps to turn the noise off and go through the official figures one by one, with the context that almost always gets left out.
No medals and no blame: what has improved, what has got worse, and what was never in the government’s hands. And the uncomfortable question almost nobody asks calmly: was an adjustment this harsh avoidable, or was it the toll Argentina had to pay to keep from going bankrupt? Because in economics it is easy to lie with true figures — telling only half of them, mistaking what happens at the same time for what causes what, or forgetting where the country started.
Where it started from (the context that gets forgotten)
Milei did not inherit a calm country. He took over runaway inflation — 211.4% over the twelve months of 2023, according to INDEC, Argentina’s national statistics office, with December already on his watch — gross central bank reserves of $21,209 million, 41.7% of the population in poverty in the second half of 2023, and, by Milei’s own account when he took office, a state spending far more than it took in and plugging the hole by printing money, which is the fuel inflation runs on. That is the starting point: a country that had spent decades living with rising prices as a chronic illness.
The big win: inflation and a balanced budget
Start with what almost nobody disputes. Annual inflation has fallen from 211.4% to around 33% in 2026, passing through 118% at the end of 2024. Behind that sits something more technical and just as decisive: Argentina closed 2024 with a budget surplus for the first time in some fourteen years, according to the Ministry of the Economy. The state stopped spending more than it earned. Total spending by the National Administration fell 25.9% in real terms in 2024, according to Congress’s budget office. This is the famous chainsaw: fewer energy and transport subsidies, less public works, smaller transfers to the provinces, and a deep cut to pensions. With no deficit there is no need to print money, and without printing, inflation eases. That, in one sentence, is the engine of the whole plan.
The cost: bills, and poverty that spiked before it fell
But that win has been paid for, and there is no point dressing it up. Public services, heavily subsidised before, have risen far more than everything else: the utility basket for a household without subsidies in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, known there as the AMBA, rose 944% between December 2023 and August 2026, against 249% for prices in general, according to the IIEP, an economics institute at the University of Buenos Aires. The flip side of removing subsidies is that households get the bill. And poverty went the whole way round: from 41.7% of people in the second half of 2023 it shot up to 52.9% in the first half of 2024 — with extreme poverty at 18.1% — and from there fell to 28.2% at the close of 2025. In the first half of 2026 it rose again, to 32.3% (some 9.7 million people in the 31 urban areas the survey covers), which is INDEC’s latest half-yearly reading, published in September 2026; according to INDEC, it is not a significant change from the first half of 2025 (31.6%). There is no official quarterly figure, because INDEC measures poverty by half-years. From that same report comes the hardest figure: 44.5% of people aged 0 to 14 live in poor households. There is also a detail about wages. INDEC’s general wage index was up 35.7% year on year in June 2026, above inflation over the same period (33.5%), but only because of informal work (59.5%), which INDEC estimates with a five-month lag. Registered private-sector pay was up 29.6% and public-sector pay 30.1%, below prices. In short: the adjustment worked in the state’s accounts, but citizens paid for it, and those at the bottom felt it first and hardest.
Argentina in six indicators
Year-on-year inflation by default. Tap a label to change indicator.
Year-on-year inflation hit its low of Milei’s term in October 2025, at 31.3%. In 2026 it has moved between 32.4% and 33.8%; in September, 33.4%.
Source: INDEC, consumer price index — year-on-year change. The 211.4% is the cumulative figure for the twelve months of 2023 published in the December 2023 report. The monthly series, up to September 2026, is at indec.gob.ar.
2024 surplus: the first in some fourteen years (≈0.3% of GDP on the financial balance).
Source: Argentina’s Ministry of the Economy, 17 January 2025 — argentina.gob.ar.
From the same INDEC report: in the first half of 2026 extreme poverty stands at 7.5% of people and 5.6% of households. The 32.3% is provisional and, according to INDEC, not a significant change from the 31.6% of the first half of 2025.
Source: INDEC, “Incidencia de la pobreza y la indigencia en 31 aglomerados urbanos”, first half of 2026, table 1 — indec.gob.ar. The second half of 2023 comes from the report for the second half of 2025 — indec.gob.ar. A half-yearly measure.
By service, between December 2023 and August 2026: natural gas 2,071%, transport 1,442%, water 544% and electricity 501%. All four above the 249% for prices in general; gas and transport above the 944% for the basket itself.
Source: IIEP (UBA-CONICET), Tariffs and Subsidies Report no. 41, August 2026: “From December 2023 to August 2026 the AMBA basket of public services rose by 944%, while the general price level is estimated to have risen by 249%” (translated from the Spanish). Both figures are nominal and cover the AMBA, greater Buenos Aires, not the whole country; the basket is that of a household without subsidies.
2026 and 2027 are IMF forecasts from October 2026. The 2025 figure is an INDEC reading, still preliminary, not a projection.
Source: for 2025, INDEC national accounts, “Informe de avance del nivel de actividad. Segundo trimestre de 2026” (17 September 2026), table 2: 4.5% in 2025, preliminary data — indec.gob.ar. For 2026 and 2027: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2026 — imf.org.
The BCRA’s statistics do not include a net reserves series, so the comparison runs gross against gross. Over the same period the official retail exchange rate went from 391 pesos to the dollar on 7 December 2023 to 1,531 on 25 August 2026; the highest the series has reached since December 2023 is 1,572.65, on 3 November 2026.
Source: BCRA, Argentina’s central bank, Monetary Statistics v4.0, variable “international reserves” (daily balances, in US$ millions).
The recovery starting to show
The picture is not only austerity. After the initial recession — unavoidable when you turn off the tap all at once — activity is growing again: GDP rose 4.5% in 2025 according to INDEC, with energy and mining as the engine. Above all Vaca Muerta, the huge shale oil and gas field in Patagonia that has become the country’s main export bet. The IMF forecasts 2.1% for 2026 and 3.5% for 2027 (October 2026 forecasts). In the second quarter of 2026 GDP fell 0.6% from the first quarter and investment was down 11.1% year on year, according to INDEC. Reserves have been rebuilt: on 25 August 2026 gross reserves closed at $50,913 million, a high for the Milei era and the highest level since September 2019. The debate now is when the “cepo”, the controls that limit how many dollars Argentines can buy, will be lifted for good. Since 14 April 2025, individuals have been able to buy dollars without prior approval from the BCRA. That is the government’s underlying argument: the worst is over and the good part is starting to arrive.
The real question: was it avoidable?
This is the core of it, and it deserves a serious answer rather than a slogan. Milei argues there was no alternative: when he took office, on 10 December 2023, he said that “all the gradualist programmes ended badly” and that, with no funding to stretch the process out, only shock was left. His case, in short: a country cannot sustain three-digit inflation indefinitely, and part of the problem was precisely subsidies and spending that could not be paid for; so some things getting dearer is the unavoidable toll for not ending up in hyperinflation and collapse.
On the other side, the criticism does not deny an adjustment was needed, but questions how it was shared out: the weight fell disproportionately on pensioners and vulnerable households, and those at the bottom could have been protected more while more was cut at the top. It is the old dilemma between “shock” and “gradualism”, and it has no clean technical answer: it depends on how much real fiscal room there was and how much social pain is acceptable in exchange for stability. Telling it honestly means accepting that both things can be true at once: that the adjustment was largely unavoidable and that how it was shared out is open to argument.
What was not in the government’s hands (and a warning)
Some of the good and some of the bad comes from before: the inheritance already described. And a warning about method: INDEC’s official poverty figure is used here, without buying either the government’s story or the catastrophist one.
What comes next
There are elections in 2027, and the whole plan is on the line there. The question is not ideological but practical: if inflation stays low and activity grows, but poverty does not fall enough, will society hold out long enough for the good part to reach everyone’s table? Because GDP pays nobody’s bills: what counts is your wage, and what your bills cost.
Argentina is not an experiment that confirms an ideology: it is a real country where one thing improves while another gets worse at the same time, and where the interesting question is not “Milei, good or bad?” but “was there another way out of here, and who has to pay for it?”. The data itself points to a partial answer: real fiscal room was minimal, so a slower adjustment would have stretched inflation — and its own social cost — out over time, with no guarantee of a better result. Argentina already tried gradualism under Mauricio Macri between 2015 and 2019, and still ended in a currency crisis and an IMF bailout. Where there does seem to have been more room is in the sharing out: protecting pensioners and vulnerable households a little more while cutting deeper elsewhere. Neither route avoids the pain entirely; it only changes who pays it and when.
Anyone selling you just one half is selling you half the story.
Update · 4 November 2026
Correction. A check of the figures in this piece against their sources found these errors and out-of-date figures. They are corrected in the text, the chart and the metadata:
- Poverty: it said the 28.2% for the second half of 2025 was the latest figure. In September 2026 INDEC published the first half of 2026: 32.3% (provisional), not a significant change from the 31.6% of the first half of 2025. The chart goes from three half-years to six.
- People in poverty: it said some 8.5 million, without saying where. There were 8,474,136 in the 31 urban areas the survey covers, not in the whole country. In the first half of 2026, some 9.7 million.
- Children: it said 41.3% of under-14s (second half of 2025). The new figure is 44.5% of people aged 0 to 14.
- Extreme poverty: it said 6.3% of people and 4.8% of households. In the first half of 2026, 7.5% and 5.6%.
- Wages: it said they had begun to recover and had gone three months in a row without losing to prices. In June 2026 registered private-sector pay (29.6%) and public-sector pay (30.1%) rose less than inflation (33.5%); the general index beat it only because of informal work, which INDEC estimates with a five-month lag.
- Milei quote: “always end in crisis” is not what he said. When he took office, on 10 December 2023, he said that “all the gradualist programmes ended badly”.
- Reserves: it said much of the recent rise came from gold rather than purchases. The BCRA bought $13,824 million between 1 January and 25 August 2026, and its series does not separate out gold. The claim has been taken out.
- Inflation chart note: it said the end of subsidies and the adjustment explained much of the fall. It had no source, and removing subsidies pushed regulated prices up. It now gives the October 2025 low (31.3%) and the rise in 2026 (33.4% in September).
- Inflation: the standfirst said it reached 33% “in two years”. Two years in, in December 2025, it was 31.5%; 33% is the 2026 figure. The 211.4% for 2023 includes December, Milei’s first month.
- 2025 GDP: INDEC revised it from 4.4% to 4.5% (preliminary data). The forecasts of “near 3%” for 2026 and 2027 are replaced by the IMF’s of October 2026: 2.1% and 3.5%. The claim that investment and exports drove growth, which had no source, has been taken out: in the second quarter of 2026 investment was down 11.1% year on year and exports were up 13.7%; GDP fell 0.6% from the first quarter.
- Dollar: it gave 1,533.63 pesos (1 September 2026) as the series high since December 2023. On 3 November 2026 it reached 1,572.65.
- 2024 spending cut: it said around 27% in real terms, with no source. Congress’s budget office gives 25.9% for the National Administration.
- Utility bills: the 944% is the basket for a household without subsidies; the text now says so.
- Cepo: the text now says that since 14 April 2025 individuals can buy dollars without prior approval from the BCRA (Comunicación “A” 8226).
- Taken out for lack of a source: that poverty measurement is “politically disputed”, the “15 million rescued” story, the drought and international prices as causes, the agreement of “almost every analyst” on fiscal room, and that the market treated the end of the cepo as likely. That the deficit was covered by printing money is now attributed to Milei, who put a figure on it when he took office.
Sources
- INDEC, Argentina’s national statistics office — consumer prices (inflation), GDP, and half-yearly poverty and extreme poverty. Primary source. Report “Incidencia de la pobreza y la indigencia en 31 aglomerados urbanos”, first half of 2026 — indec.gob.ar: 32.3% poverty (provisional), 7.5% extreme poverty and 44.5% of people aged 0 to 14 in poor households. The report for the second half of 2025 — indec.gob.ar — gives 28.2%. Wages: INDEC wage index, June 2026 — indec.gob.ar.
- 2024 fiscal balance (financial surplus of the national public sector, the first since 2010) — Argentina’s Ministry of the Economy, 17 January 2025 — argentina.gob.ar. Spending by the National Administration in 2024, down 25.9% in real terms — Congress’s budget office (OPC) — opc.gob.ar.
- GDP — 2025 is an INDEC reading, still preliminary: national accounts, “Informe de avance del nivel de actividad. Segundo trimestre de 2026” (17 September 2026), table 2, +4.5% — indec.gob.ar. 2026 and 2027 are IMF forecasts, World Economic Outlook, October 2026 — imf.org.
- Reserves, central bank dollar purchases and the exchange rate — BCRA, Argentina’s central bank, Monetary Statistics v4.0. The cepo — BCRA, Comunicación “A” 8226, 11 April 2025 — bcra.gob.ar.
- Shock against gradualism — Milei’s inauguration speech, 10 December 2023 — casarosada.gob.ar; analysis (LA NACION, Prime Economics).